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 Introduction 
Measles is an extremely contagious disease that has been resurgent in the US and 
globally in 2019.1 Over 1200 cases of measles were reported in the US in 2019, the 
most since 1992.2 Approximately 10% of these cases have led to hospitalization, 5% 
of which had complications including pneumonia and encephalitis.3 Measles can 
compromise an individual’s immune system, potentially causing problems after 
recovery,4, 5 and may also lead to death.6 
Fortunately, immunity to measles is conferred to 97% of people who receive 2 
doses of the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine. In the US, the first dose 
is recommended at 12 months and the second before starting school.7 As measles 
is highly infectious, 92%-96% of a homogeneously mixed population should be 
vaccinated to achieve herd immunity.8 
Vaccination rates were sufficiently high to eliminate measles in the US (meaning 
no continuous transmission within the US for at least 12 months) in 2000.9 
Subsequent decreases in vaccination rates in some areas have facilitated measles 
transmission, putting the US’s elimination status in jeopardy.10 The US marginally 
retained its elimination status in 2019.11 
In the US, schoolchildren must either be vaccinated against measles or obtain a 
vaccine exemption. Requirements for acquiring a vaccine exemption vary by state, 
however, and 45 of the 50 states allow exemptions for nonmedical reasons as of 
May 2020.12 
A small minority of parents refuse vaccinations for their children and seek 
exemptions for nonmedical reasons, including concerns about the perceived safety 
of vaccines, a lack of knowledge concerning vaccines, a low perceived susceptibility 
to measles, and social influences.13,14 Vaccine hesitancy, defined as the “delay in 
acceptance or refusal of vaccination despite availability of vaccination services,”15 is 
not evenly distributed in the population, leading to geographic clusters of 
unvaccinated children.16,17 This clustering potentially would allow measles to spread 
in a community that has a vaccination rate above the herd-immunity threshold.18 
Three measles outbreaks in Washington (Clark County) and New York (Rockland 
County and New York City) states in 2019 infected 71, 312, and 649 people,19-21 
respectively. Local government enacted public health interventions in each area with 
the aim of limiting the spread of measles. These interventions included suspending 
unvaccinated students from schools19,22-24 and mandatory vaccinations.25 Other 
interventions included contract tracing,9,20 free vaccination clinics,25 and prohibiting 
unvaccinated minors from entering places of public assembly23 (the last was 
rescinded after a court challenge26). An overview of public health interventions for 
measles outbreaks is given by Gastañaduy et al.27 
Beyond these states, the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the ability and 
willingness of many governments to limit school attendance to control the spread of 
an infectious disease (eg, Governor of the State of Texas28), albeit with significant 
concerns.29,30 
Texas is the most populous American state that allows nonmedical vaccine 
exemptions. Its vaccine laws have been found to be among the least effective in the 
US at reducing vaccine exemptions.31 Nonmedical vaccine exemptions have 
increased annually in Texas32 since a law change in 2003 made it easier to opt out 
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of vaccination.33 Studies have raised concerns about the potential for measles 
outbreaks in Texas.32-35 
We simulated measles outbreaks in 6 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of 
Texas using an agent-based model. The model included the location, enrollment size, 
and vaccination rates of the schools in each MSA. Public health interventions in which 
unvaccinated students were either suspended from school, vaccinated, or both were 
included in the simulations to evaluate how successful different interventions may be 
in reducing the overall number of measles cases. 
Methods 
Agent-based model 
 
We forecast the spread of measles under different public health interventions with 
an agent-based model. The agent-based model was developed using FRED (A 
Framework for Reconstructing Epidemiological Dynamics).36 The simulations follow 
the approach discussed in Sinclair et al34; we summarize the key features of the 
simulation model here, with some updates from the model previously discussed,34 
including the addition of 6 public health intervention scenarios. 
We chose 6 MSAs in Texas to simulate measles outbreaks: Austin-Round Rock-
Georgetown; Dallas-Fort Worth; Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown; Midland; and Tyler. 
These MSAs have previously been identified as having a risk of larger measles 
outbreaks than other areas in Texas.34,35 
An MSA is a geographically contiguous group of one or more counties with close 
economic and social ties37; these ties (such as commuting) may allow an infectious 
disease to spread within an MSA more readily than to external areas. Dallas-Fort 
Worth and Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown are the fourth and fifth largest MSAs in the 
US, respectively. The member counties of each MSA are periodically updated by the 
United States Census Bureau; these simulations use the September 2018 
boundaries.38 
FRED uses a synthetic population of the United States based on the 2010 
census.39,40 Each member of the US population is represented by an agent. Each 
agent is assigned a household location based on the population size of each US 
census block. The characteristics of each agent are drawn from the distribution of 
the population’s characteristics in each geographic area. This allows the agents in 
any geographical area to be representative of the real-life population. These 
characteristics are age, gender, race, household size, and household income. 
Agents were assigned to schools or workplaces depending on their age and 
employment rates. Agents representing school students were assigned to public or 
private schools, with a probability weighted by their demographic characteristics.39,40 
Each school in the model corresponds to a real-world equivalent, at the same 
location and with the same age range and student enrollment.39,40 Agents 
representing workers were assigned to workplaces based on commuting patterns 
and the distribution of workplace sizes. 
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Table 1. Contact distributions 
Distribution Household Neighborhood School Workplace 
1 30 33 24.67 12.33 
2 23 35.34 27 14.67 
3 12 39 30.67 18.33 
 
 
Transmission 
 
Agents in our model sequentially attended 3 mixing locations each simulated day: 
their household, school or workplace, and neighborhood (agents representing the 
unemployed and retired did not attend a school or workplace). Agents could come 
into contact with one another if they were simultaneously located in the same place. 
These contacts allowed measles to potentially spread among the population. 
The basic reproduction number, R0, is the average number of new infections that 
will occur from a single case being introduced to an entirely susceptible population. 
For measles, R0, has been found to be approximately 12–18,41,42 although studies 
have found outbreaks beyond this range.43 We calibrated the transmissibility of 
measles in our model using a simulated entirely susceptible population of Austin-
Round Rock-Georgetown. The transmissibility determines the probability that an 
infectious contact will be made between an infectious and a susceptible agent, if they 
are co-located in a mixing location (household, school, workplace, and 
neighborhood). 
Previous infectious disease studies have attempted to quantify the relative 
number of infections that occur in different locations where people interact. We 
primarily assume that during an outbreak in a hypothetical entirely susceptible 
population, 30% of transmissions would occur in households, 33% in neighborhoods, 
and 37% in schools and workplaces; with twice the per-capita transmission rate in 
schools relative to workplaces44,45 (we refer to this as “contact distribution 1”). 
Relative contact rates calculated by Bayham and Fenichel46 were also used for 
further simulations of Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown. The proportion of infections 
occurring in the household were set to the upper and lower boundaries calculated by 
Bayham and Fenichel (“contact distribution 2” and “contact distribution 3”), and the 
remaining transmission proportions were redistributed between neighborhoods, 
schools, and workplaces (relative to the proportions used by Ferguson et al45). The 
3 distributions of contact rates are given in Table 1. Changing contact rates can alter 
the transmissibility of measles in our models. Calibration simulations were run with 
each contact distribution using 1000 simulations in Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown. 
In each simulation, schools are closed on weekends, only agents designated as 
weekend workers (assumed to be 20% of workers) attended their workplaces on 
weekends, and neighborhood contact rates were assumed to double on weekends 
compared to weekdays. 
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Vaccination rates 
 
Simulations used 2 sets of vaccination rates. The first used the reported 2018 
vaccination rates. If vaccination rates continue to fall, we assume that the fall will be 
concentrated in schools that are undervaccinated in 2018; therefore, the second set 
decreases vaccination rates by 5% in only the schools that are undervaccinated in 
2018, while keeping the others constant. In Texas, 0.2% of students are medically 
ineligible for vaccination.47 Assuming a 0.2% uncertainty on this value, we assume 
any school with a vaccination rate under 99.6% is undervaccinated. 
The MMR vaccine is 97% effective at conferring immunity to measles with the 
recommended 2 doses; a single dose provides immunity to 93% of recipients.7 
We vaccinated the school-attending agents according to the published 
vaccination rate48 of the real-world equivalent to their simulated school. Private-
school vaccination rates are published individually in Texas, but public-school rates 
are only published on the school district level. We assumed that all public schools in 
a district had the same vaccination rate. 
Not all schools and school districts report their vaccination rates, despite this 
being mandatory.48 Vaccination rates for these schools and school districts were 
estimated using the distribution of vaccination rates of nearby schools and districts, 
with the method discussed in Sinclair et al.34 
We assume all agents representing people born before 1957 are immune to 
measles due to prior exposure, in line with Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) assumptions.49 Agents in the synthetic population are assigned 
ages rather than birth dates; we defined agents who are aged 62 or older as those 
who were born before 1957 (this corresponds to being born before 1957 on January 
1, 2019). 
94.8% of the rest of the agents (ie, not school-attending or aged 62 or older) were 
assumed to be vaccinated, using findings from an antibody seroprevalence 
analysis50 and an assumed 97% vaccination efficacy. This was also the vaccination 
rate assumed for the 2.2% of school-aged agents in the model designated as home-
schooled.40 
Measles model 
 
Measles infection was modeled as having 6 stages: an initial incubation period of 
11.50 ± 1.23 days (median, dispersion of a lognormal distribution); a 1-day latent 
phase; a 3-day fever phase; a 4-day rash phase; a 10-day recovery phase; and an 
indefinite immune phase.51 Agents in the latent, fever, and rash phases could infect 
other, susceptible agents. Fifty percent and 95% of agents in the fever phase and 
rash phase, respectively, confined themselves to their household. 
Measles was introduced at the start of each simulation to one school student for 
whom a vaccine had been refused. We record the total number of measles cases 
among students for whom a vaccine has been refused for nonmedical reasons 
(“refusers”) and other members of the population (“bystanders”), comprising those 
for whom vaccination failed to confer immunity, those who are medically ineligible, 
and unvaccinated members of the population who do not attend school. 
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Outbreaks were simulated for 270 days, corresponding to approximately the 
length of a school year (the daily interactions of students may differ during the 
summer vacation). 
Interventions 
 
In simulations where a measles outbreak occurred (defined as 3 or more cases 
linked in time and place3), we evaluated different public health intervention scenarios 
targeting unvaccinated school students. Interventions were either triggered in only 
the schools with at least one measles case (on the first day of a student entering the 
rash stage) or in all schools across the MSA (on the first day that a third agent in the 
MSA entered the rash stage). Interventions were not triggered if fewer than 3 cases 
occurred in the simulation run. 
Two types of interventions were simulated: suspension from school and mass 
vaccination. These follow 2 strategies employed in Washington and New York states’ 
2018-2019 outbreaks.19,22,24,25 
For suspensions, all unvaccinated students did not attend school as part of their 
weekday routines (but continued to interact with other agents in their households and 
neighborhoods). This comprised both students for whom a vaccine had been refused 
and medically exempt students. Students were suspended until 21 simulated days 
passed without any rash cases among agents at their school or in the MSA (for the 
school-specific and MSA-wide interventions, respectively). Twenty-one days is the 
upper limit on incubation time for measles, thus reducing the risk of susceptible 
students returning to school while another student has been exposed to measles but 
is not yet symptomatic. 
Recognizing that policymakers may feel pressured to readmit students to schools 
without measles cases during an MSA-wide intervention, we also simulated an 
intervention where all unvaccinated students were initially suspended on the 
declaration of an outbreak. Students were then readmitted to individual schools after 
21 days, or 21 days after the last measles case appeared in their school. Students 
were suspended again if measles presented in their school. 
It may be considered unjust to mandate the suspension of students who are 
medically exempt from vaccination. Additional simulations in one MSA (Austin-
Round Rock-Georgetown) were run in which only refusers were suspended (and not 
medically exempt students) to provide a comparison of potential outbreak sizes. 
The second intervention explored was the vaccination of students for whom a 
vaccine had previously been refused. Medically exempt students were not 
vaccinated. In simulations where outbreaks occurred, unvaccinated students took 1–
7 days (randomly drawn from a uniform distribution) to receive a vaccination and a 
further 11–24 days (random, uniform distribution) for the vaccine to succeed or fail.52 
Immunity was conferred to 93% of newly vaccinated agents, matching the efficacy 
of one dose of the MMR vaccine to confer immunity.7 
Each intervention was simulated 1000 times in 6 Texas MSAs at 2018 vaccination 
rates. Further simulations explored a scenario in which the vaccination rate of each 
school that is undervaccinated in 2018 drops 5%. Simulations with no interventions 
were also run. 
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Both intervention types (suspension and vaccination) represent idealized 
scenarios. In the school suspension scenario, it assumes that measles cases are 
identified on the first day of the rash stage and that all schools and students are 
compliant with the suspension. Not all schools were initially compliant with an order 
to suspend students in the 2018–2019 Rockland County outbreak.53 We also do not 
account for any possible increase in out-of-school interactions between suspended 
students. In the vaccination case, it assumes parents who have previously chosen 
not to vaccinate their children will do so in the event of an outbreak. While there is 
some recent evidence of mass vaccine uptake during outbreaks in undervaccinated 
communities,3,54,55 it is unlikely that all children will be vaccinated, even if vaccination 
is mandatory. 
The potential benefit of alternative interventions, contact tracing and high 
vaccination coverage prior to outbreaks, have previously been investigated with an 
early version of the FRED agent-based model framework.56 
Statistical Analysis 
 
FRED simulations are stochastic: the number of agents infected with measles in 
each outbreak is dependent on which agent is the primary case. Our simulations 
randomly select a student for whom a vaccine has been refused to be the primary 
case. If this student attends a school with many other susceptible students, a large 
outbreak may ensue. Alternatively, if the primary case occurs in the only 
unvaccinated student in a school, it is less likely that the primary case will infect many 
other students, resulting in a smaller number of cases. 
As we aim to evaluate the potential benefits of different public health 
interventions, we focus on the plausible worst-case scenario. We consider the 
plausible worst-case scenario to be the number of cases at the 95th percentile (ie, 
1-in-20 measles introductions) when the simulation results are ordered by the total 
number of measles cases. Uncertainties on the 95th percentile were evaluated with 
a nonparametric bootstrap estimate on the simulation results (1000 samples, each 
of size 1000). 
Results 
Public health interventions which suspend, vaccinate, or both suspend and vaccinate 
students from school during measles outbreaks are associated with statistically 
significant reductions in the potential number of cases (see Figure 1 for forecasts in 
Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown, and Appendixes 1 and 2 for all 6 MSAs). 
Suspending unvaccinated students from school during an outbreak is forecast to 
be the most effective single intervention, reducing the number of infections in a 
plausible worst-case scenario by 96.6 (95.5–97.4)% (median, confidence interval). 
At 2018 vaccination rates, the 95th percentile forecast outbreak sizes are similar 
regardless of whether the suspension applies only in schools that students with 
measles attend, to all schools in an MSA, or if the suspension is initially MSA-wide 
and followed by a staggered readmission in schools without measles. For example, 
in the Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown MSA, a forecast 527 (466–572) cases if there  
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(a) 2018 vaccination rates 
 
(b) 5% reduction in vaccination rates in 2018 under-vaccinated schools 
Figure 1. Forecast number of measles cases with a range of public health interventions. 
Forecasts use (a) 2018 school vaccination rates, and (b) if vaccination rates drop 5% in 
schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated. Interventions comprise suspending and 
vaccinating unvaccinated students if measles cases are present in their school or 
metropolitan area. Results are for the Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA). Bars indicate the median and interquartile range of the number of 
measles cases from 1000 simulations in each MSA. Whiskers show the 5-95% confidence 
interval; we assume the upper end to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Cases are forecast 
for students for whom a vaccine has been refused (“refusers”) and the rest of the population 
(“bystanders”) as well as the combined population (“all”). Forecasts for 5 other MSAs are 
provided in Appendixes 1 and 2.  
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(a) 2018 vaccination rates 
 
(b) 5% reduction in vaccination rates in 2018 under-vaccinated schools 
Figure 2. Forecast number of student-days suspended after measles introductions in the 
Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Forecasts use (a) 
2018 school vaccination rates, and (b) if vaccination rates drop 5% in schools which, in 
2018, are undervaccinated. The total number of days each unvaccinated student was 
suspended from their school was summed for 4 intervention scenarios which mandate 
student suspensions. Bars indicate the median and interquartile range of the number of 
measles cases from 1000 simulations in each MSA. Whiskers show the 5-95% confidence 
interval; we assume the upper end to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Cases are forecast 
for students for whom a vaccine has been refused (“refusers”) and the rest of the population 
(“bystanders”) as well as the combined population (“all”). Forecasts of total student-days 
suspended for 5 other MSAs are provided in Appendixes 3 and 4.  
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is no intervention are reduced to 19 (17–21), 18 (16–20), and 17 (15–20) cases with 
the respective suspensions, at 2018 vaccination rates (Appendix 1). 
Suspending unvaccinated students from schools with measles cases reduces (in 
a plausible worst-case scenario) measles cases by 68%–96% of the cases without 
an intervention, in the 4 MSAs which have the largest forecast outbreaks. The benefit 
is reduced in MSAs with smaller forecast outbreaks (dropping to 82% and 55% in 
Beaumont-Port Arthur and Midland, respectively). Suspension interventions reduce 
cases by 97%–98% if vaccination rates drop 5% in schools undervaccinated in 2018. 
If vaccination rates drop 5%, the MSA-wide suspension intervention is associated 
with a statistically significant reduction compared to the other suspension 
interventions in each MSA evaluated (suspending students in schools with measles 
and suspending students in all schools, followed by a staggered readmission in 
measles-free schools). For example, in Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown, not 
intervening could see 1503 (1295–1691) cases, whereas suspending unvaccinated 
students across the MSA reduces this to 24 (21–26); suspending students only in 
schools with measles and a staggered readmission of students from an MSA-wide 
suspension are associated with 34 (31–39) and 29 (27–33) cases, respectively (see 
Appendix 2). 
Vaccinating eligible students is also associated with a reduction in outbreak sizes, 
albeit less so than suspending students. In half of the MSAs, vaccinating during an 
outbreak anywhere in the MSA forecasts fewer cases than vaccinating only in 
schools with measles cases (at 2018 vaccination rates); the outbreak sizes are 
forecast to be similar in the other half. If vaccination rates drop 5%, the worst-case 
outbreak sizes in the MSA vaccination intervention drops by 31%–78% compared to 
the size of the school-only vaccination intervention. 
The combined interventions, in which students are both suspended and 
vaccinated, are not associated with further reductions in the worst-case number of 
infections at 2018 vaccination rates, compared to only suspending students. The 
same applies if vaccination rates drop 5%. 
The total number of school days missed by suspended students for 4 intervention 
scenarios are given in Figure 2 for Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown (other MSAs 
given in Appendixes 3 and 4). At both 2018 and reduced vaccination rates, 
suspending all unvaccinated students in an MSA leads to approximately 10–100 
times more missed school days than targeting schools with measles cases. At 2018 
vaccination rates, suspending all unvaccinated students in Houston-Sugar Land-
Baytown could result in more than 1.1 million student days lost in school, in a 
plausible worst-case outbreak. This would be reduced to under 5000 if only schools 
with measles cases were targeted. 
We did not find a statistically significant difference in the potential worst-case 
outbreak sizes whether medically ineligible students were included in suspension 
policies or not (at the 2018 or the reduced vaccination rates) (Figure 3 and Appendix 
5). 
Alternative contact distributions 
The distribution of R0 values for each calibrated set of contact distributions are 
provided in Table 2. The distributions are generated from the 1000 simulations for  
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(a) 2018 vaccination rates 
 
(b) 5% reduction in vaccination rates in 2018 under-vaccinated schools 
Figure 3. Forecast outbreak sizes comparing applying intervention policies only to “refusers” 
(students for whom a vaccine has been refused) and to all unvaccinated students (ie, including 
medically ineligible students). Policies comprise suspending and vaccinating unvaccinated 
students if measles cases are present in their school or metropolitan area. Forecasts are shown 
for Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown. Bars indicate the median and interquartile range of the 
number of measles cases from 1000 simulations in each MSA. Whiskers show the 5%-95% 
confidence interval; we assume the upper end to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Cases are 
forecast for students for whom a vaccine has been refused (“refusers”) and the rest of the 
population (“bystanders”) as well as the combined population (“all”).  
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each contact distribution. The R0 values for each of the contact distributions are 
similar. 
At 2018 vaccination rates, contact distribution 3 forecasts fewer cases than 
contact distribution 1 in the “no intervention” case, with 415 (348–451) and 527 (466–
572) cases, respectively (Appendix 6). However, there is no significant difference in 
the number of cases between any of the contact distributions when interventions are 
enacted at 2018 or reduced vaccination rates. 
 
Refusers and Bystanders 
 
Across all simulations where 25 or more cases are forecast (including each 
intervention), 58 (46–70)% (mean, SD) of measles infections occur in children for 
whom a vaccine has been refused, with 42 (30–54)% occurring in other people (ie, 
bystanders). For simulations with 3–24 cases, the percentage of infections among 
refusers was 48 (24–72)% (mean, SD). With contact distribution 2, the forecast 
fraction of cases in bystanders were 42 (30–54)% (>24 cases) and 46 (23–69)% (3–
24 cases), and for contact distribution 3: 37 (26–48)% and 43 (20–66)%, 
respectively. 
Discussion 
Our simulations suggest that the public health interventions applied may significantly 
reduce the potential size of measles outbreaks in 6 Texas metropolitan areas, with 
a 68%–96% reduction in areas with the largest potential outbreak sizes. If we 
assume that similar findings would be found across the US, the interventions enacted 
in Clark County, Rockland County, and New York City during their 2018–2019 
outbreaks may have been effective at limiting the spread of measles. 
Our results suggest that suspending unvaccinated students from schools is 
associated with fewer total measles cases than vaccinating susceptible students 
during an outbreak (however, both are beneficial). This may be due to several 
causes, but an important factor is likely to be the time delay between deciding to 
seek a vaccine and gaining immunity. This period, taking 1 to 4 weeks in these 
simulations, leaves students vulnerable to infection at the beginning of the outbreak. 
Additionally, the 93% success rate of one dose of the MMR vaccine means 7% of 
unvaccinated students effectively take no action to lessen their chance of infection. 
Suspending students across an MSA appears to have little advantage over 
suspending students only in schools with measles cases at 2018 vaccination rates; 
however, a significant benefit is predicted if vaccination rates drop 5% in 
undervaccinated schools. Alternatively, if vaccination rates drop, initially suspending 
all unvaccinated students in an MSA, before readmitting students in schools without 
measles cases, may reduce the total number of measles cases compared to only 
ever suspending students in schools with measles cases, but less successfully than 
suspending all unvaccinated students in an MSA. 
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The advantage of suspending all unvaccinated students in an MSA is that they 
are not attending a school if someone presents there with measles (except for the 
cases before an outbreak is declared). If students are only suspended from schools 
once an enrolled student is identified as having measles, there may have been 
opportunities for infections. However, these simulations suggest this does not lead 
to significantly more infections in a plausible worst-case scenario. This may be due 
to the relatively long incubation time for measles (up to 21 days3). Quickly 
suspending all unvaccinated students in a school limits the opportunity for measles 
to spread within a school, as only the original infectious student (and any vaccinated 
students without immunity) will ever potentially attend the school while infectious. 
On the other hand, if vaccination rates drop, there is a much larger number of 
susceptible students in some schools, all of whom have the chance to become 
infected by the school’s initial measles case before anyone is suspended. This might 
lead to a greater number of measles cases in the community and potentially leads 
to more infections occurring outside of schools. 
Nonmedical vaccine exemptions have increased annually since 2003 in Texas, 
suggesting that, unless something occurs to change vaccine perceptions, MSA-wide 
interventions may become optimal in the future. Drops in vaccination rates may be 
compounded as the fraction of the population born before 1957 (who are all 
presumed immunized due to prior exposure49) decreases with time. 
Both suspending and vaccinating unvaccinated students does not yield any 
significant reduction in cases compared to only suspending unvaccinated students 
at 2018 vaccination rates, but does if vaccination rates drop. This suggests that 
stronger interventions be used in areas with lower vaccination rates. 
Despite not appearing to further reduce outbreak sizes, vaccinating unvaccinated 
students who are suspended is nevertheless beneficial to the students and the wider 
population. Newly vaccinated students are unlikely to be infected in future outbreaks 
and therefore unlikely to infect anyone else. Newly vaccinated students may also be 
able to return to schools sooner than waiting out an epidemic at home. It also may 
be beneficial to vaccinate students if an outbreak occurs anywhere in their MSA, if 
suspension interventions are only applied in schools where measles cases are 
recorded (a scenario that has not been investigated here). 
Suspending students is likely to be easier to implement than vaccinating students 
for whom a vaccine has previously been refused: even with a mandatory vaccination 
order, there were ethical and practical issues with enacting New York City’s 
vaccination policy25 (a debate that is also playing out in other countries which 
recently introduced mandatory vaccination laws57,58). However, if out-of-school 
interactions increase among suspended students, then suspending students may 
not be as effective as predicted. It may be beneficial to encourage those responsible 
Table 2. Distribution of R0 values from 1000 calibration simulations with a completely 
susceptible population for the 3 contact distributions provided in Table 1 
Distribution Min Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 Max 
1 12 12.86 13.30 13.74 15 
2 12 12.81 13.25 13.74 16 
3 12 12.80 13.32 13.78 15 
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for the suspended students to restrict the students’ interactions, especially among 
their peers, to prevent the potential spread of measles outside of schools. 
Interventions targeted at specific schools are also likely to be easier to implement 
than MSA-wide interventions. It will require fewer resources to check that action has 
been taken at a subset of the schools than all of the schools. Furthermore, the 
number of school days lost through suspension is greatly reduced if suspensions are 
targeted at schools with measles cases, compared to applying them to all schools. 
Additionally, MSAs are not a government level of power. Health departments 
operate on county, state, and national levels (albeit some MSAs are only one county 
in size). This may cause obstacles to enacting MSA-wide interventions quickly in the 
event of an outbreak. To preempt potential problems, county or state health 
departments should ensure they have measles outbreak intervention policies 
prepared and coordinated across county lines in advance of a measles outbreak. 
It is unlikely that any intervention effort will have a 100% compliance rate and 
accurately identify all measles cases. These forecasts are therefore for idealized 
scenarios; the potential number of measles cases may be higher in reality. 
There was no statistically significant difference found between the potential 
number of measles cases when all unvaccinated students (ie, refusers and medically 
ineligible students), or only refusers, were suspended. As no greater risk to the 
general population was found, it may be equitable to allow these students to attend 
school during outbreaks during a suspension intervention. However, there would be 
a risk of infection for these students, and the option for parents/guardians to isolate 
them, and thus reduce infection risk, should also be considered. 
Our model evenly distributes medically ineligible students across schools: if a 
school had a higher concentration of students, it might be at risk of larger outbreaks. 
This should be evaluated when deciding if medically ineligible students should stay 
home from school or not. 
The similarities in results between the 3 contact distributions suggest that the 
benefit of each intervention would be robust across a range of communities that may 
have different contact distributions. 
The 2-dose effectiveness of the MMR vaccine is taken to be 97%, as reported by 
the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices7; however, studies have found 
values for the 2-dose effectiveness ranging from 67%–100%.59-64 If a higher 
effectiveness was used in our simulations, we would expect the forecast number of 
cases in each scenario to be reduced, especially among “bystanders” (those whose 
vaccine failed). We would also expect vaccination interventions to improve more than 
school suspension interventions. However, given the much smaller number of cases 
forecast with school suspension interventions, we would still expect these to be 
advantageous compared to vaccination interventions. 
Limitations 
 
There are several limitations to this study. Primarily, all models necessarily simplify 
the real-life system they are modeling. Agent-based models allow a high level of 
specificity in the daily actions and behavior of their agents, but some of this behavior 
must be simplified and generalized. For example, we assume that agents interact 
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with their household members every day, that every student has the same probability 
of interacting with other students in their age group, and that agents preferably 
interact with agents who live near them rather than far away. The model does not 
account for mass-gathering events, such as theme parks and churches, which have 
been linked to outbreaks,65,66 nor does it account for potential infections from 
healthcare-seeking behavior, such as in doctor’s offices and hospital waiting rooms. 
The model does not stratify agents along cultural or religious lines,54,67,68 instead 
relying on household locations, school locations, and school type (private or public). 
Alternative modeling approaches make other assumptions: the classic SIR-type 
model of epidemiology69 assumes everyone within a compartment interacts equally 
with one another at all times, for example. In this model, as with all models, the 
simplifications must be considered along with the results. 
The vaccination rate data published by the Texas Department of State Health 
Services48 is limited by law and school responses. Texas law mandates that all 
schools and districts report the vaccination coverage of their students; however, only 
83% responded in the 2017–2018 school year. Data from individual public schools 
is not published, in part due to privacy concerns,70 necessitating the use of school-
district aggregated data. We assume that geographically close public schools are 
likely to have a similar vaccination coverage; however, if there are individual public 
schools with low vaccination rates, our forecasts may underestimate potential 
outbreak sizes. Legislative bills to allow individual public school data to be published 
have failed in recent years.71,72 
We assume that home-schooled students have vaccination rates consistent with 
the general population, as vaccination rates are not collected for home-schooled 
students in Texas. As Texas allows unvaccinated children to enroll in schools, there 
is not a strong motivation for vaccine-hesitant parents to home-school. Home-
schooled students represent a small fraction of school students and can be assumed 
to interact with fewer other students than their school-attending peers, suggesting 
they do not have a large effect on the spread of infectious diseases. 
We would not expect a different home-school vaccination rate to greatly alter the 
relative benefit of each intervention, as the interventions are only applied to children 
in schools (although outbreak sizes would change). However, vaccination 
interventions may be slightly less effective, as more schoolchildren would become 
infected before developing immunity. 
Not all medically exempt students are susceptible to measles: some students are 
exempt due to prior measles infection. However, medically exempt students make 
up a very small fraction of the student population and, in places where there have 
not been large or regular measles outbreaks, it is likely that most medically exempt 
students are not exempt due to prior infection. 
The forecast number of measles cases presented here is slightly different from 
those in previous work using FRED.34 These differences are due to a few factors: 
updates in the counties present in the MSAs (here the September 201838 boundaries 
were used; previously the July 2015 boundaries were used73); updates in the FRED 
code, requiring recalibration of the transmissibility of measles; and different seeds 
for random-number generators. 
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Conclusions 
Simulations of measles outbreaks in Texas find that 2 types of interventions enacted 
during outbreaks, suspending unvaccinated students from school and mandatory 
vaccinations, are associated with reductions in the potential number of measles 
cases by up to 96%. Suspending students from school is associated with the fewest 
measles cases. At 2018 vaccination rates, suspending and vaccinating students 
concurrently has no significant reduction in the potential number of cases compared 
to only suspending students, provided out-of-school contacts do not increase during 
the suspension. Further, at 2018 vaccination rates, policies that affect all schools in 
a metropolitan area have no significant reduction in the number of cases compared 
to policies which only target schools with measles cases. Only suspending 
unvaccinated students in schools with measles cases leads to 10–100 factor 
reduction in total school days suspended by all students, compared to suspending 
all unvaccinated students in a metropolitan area. However, if vaccination rates drop 
5% in schools that were undervaccinated in 2018, area-wide policies are forecast to 
be more beneficial. These results only evaluate interventions taken during an 
outbreak; vaccination before an outbreak is the most effective means of reducing 
outbreak sizes. 
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Appendix 1. Forecast number of cases with 2018 vaccination rates. Forecast number of measles cases with different policy interventions are 
provided. Forecasts use 2018 school vaccination rates in 6 Texas metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Forecasts with different interventions 
are provided. Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario. 
Confidence interval on the 95th percentile value, calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap estimate, is provided in parentheses. 
 
Intervention 
Austin- 
Round Rock-
Georgetown 
Beaumont- 
Port Arthur 
Dallas- 
Fort Worth-
Arlington 
Houston- 
Sugar Land-
Baytown 
Midland Tyler 
None 
527 
(466-572) 
11 
(9–11) 
477 
(462–497) 
53 
(44–81) 
22 
(18–25) 
146 
(141–160) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in school 
19 
(17–21) 
9 
(8–9) 
26 
(20–28) 
17 
(15–20) 
12 
(11–13) 
19 
(17–20) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in area 
then unsuspend by case free 
schools  
18 
(16–20) 
9 
(8–9) 
24 
(20–27) 
16 
(14–20) 
12 
(11–13) 
18 
(17–19) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in area 
17 
(15–20) 
8 
(8–9) 
23 
(19–26) 
16 
(14–18) 
12 
(11–13) 
18 
(16–19) 
Vaccinate unvaccinated 
students if measles in school 
49 
(43–59) 
10 
(8–12) 
75 
(67–84) 
32 
(27–41) 
15 
(14–17) 
42 
(36–44) 
Vaccinate unvaccinated 
students if measles in area 
50 
(43–53) 
9 
(8–10) 
60 
(55–71) 
24 
(20–29) 
16 
(14–17) 
38 
(35–42) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
measles in school 
18 
(16–20) 
9 
(7–9) 
22 
(20–25) 
17 
(14–18) 
12 
(10–13) 
19 
(16–18) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
measles in area 
18 
(17–20) 
8 
(8–10) 
22 
(20–25) 
16 
(15–19) 
12 
(10–13) 
17 
(17–20) 
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Appendix 2. Forecast number of cases if vaccination rates drop 5% in schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated. Forecast number of 
measles cases with different policy interventions are provided. Forecasts use a 5% drop from 2018 school vaccination rates in schools which, 
in 2018, are undervaccinated, for 6 Texas metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Forecasts with different interventions are provided. Values 
are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Confidence interval on the 
95th percentile value, calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap estimate, is provided in parentheses. 
 
Intervention 
Austin- 
Round Rock-
Georgetown 
Beaumont-Port 
Arthur 
Dallas- 
Fort Worth-
Arlington 
Houston-Sugar 
Land-Baytown 
Midland Tyler 
None 
1503 
(1295–1691) 
103 
(91–126) 
1445 
(1213–1596) 
1634 
(1436–1848) 
152 
(127–165) 
337 
(306–359) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in school 
34 
(31–39) 
21 
(19–23) 
35 
(30–41) 
45 
(39–52) 
22 
(21–25) 
24 
(21–26) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in area 
then unsuspend by case free 
schools 
29 
(27–33) 
17 
(15–19) 
32 
(28–36) 
31 
(28–35) 
19 
(16–20) 
22 
(20–24) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in area 
24 
(21–26) 
15 
(14–17) 
24 
(21–27) 
22 
(20–24) 
16 
(15–18) 
20 
(18–22) 
Vaccinate unvaccinated 
students if measles in school 
132 
(113–153) 
38 
(31–40) 
157 
(115–181) 
185 
(154–210) 
44 
(39–49) 
61 
(54–72) 
Vaccinate unvaccinated 
students if measles in area 
49 
(43–53) 
25 
(22–26) 
44 
(36–50) 
41 
(38–45) 
29 
(28–32) 
42 
(38–49) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
measles in school 
33 
(30–37) 
17 
(16–20) 
34 
(31–36) 
39 
(35–46) 
21 
(18–24) 
23 
(21–26) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
measles in area 
22 
(20–24) 
14 
(13–16) 
20 
(19–22) 
22 
(20–23) 
15 
(14–16) 
18 
(17–20) 
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Appendix 3. Forecast number of student-days suspended after measles introductions (1000s). Forecasts use the 2018 school vaccination 
rates in 6 Texas metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The total number of days each unvaccinated student was suspended from their school 
was summed for 4 intervention scenarios that mandate student suspensions. Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, 
which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Confidence interval on the 95th percentile value, calculated using a nonparametric 
bootstrap estimate, is provided in parentheses. 
 
Intervention 
Austin- 
Round Rock-
Georgetown 
Beaumont- 
Port Arthur 
Dallas- 
Fort Worth-
Arlington 
Houston- 
Sugar Land-
Baytown 
Midland Tyler 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in 
school 
6.2 
5.7–6.7) 
0.9 
(0.8–1.1) 
9.1 
(7.9–10.7) 
4.8 
(4.0–6.7) 
1.0 
(0.9–1.0) 
4.5 
(4.3–4.7) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in 
area 
237.7 
(225.2–254.4) 
19.8 
(17.8–20.3) 
789.5 
(747.6–827.3) 
1132.5 
(1053.9–1214.8) 
6.8 
(6.4–7.1) 
20.0 
(18.8–20.7) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
in school 
4.5 
(4.0–5.1) 
0.7 
(0.5–0.8) 
6.9 
(5.9–7.3) 
4.0 
(3.2–4.5) 
0.7 
(0.7–0.8) 
3.2 
(3.1–3.4) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
in area 
195.9 
(184.7–209.5) 
12.9 
(11.9–13.6) 
626.7 
(587.4–690.6) 
843.8 
(762.7–918.2) 
5.1 
(4.7–5.3) 
16.5 
(14.80–17.6) 
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Appendix 4. Forecast number of student-days suspended after measles introductions (1000s). Forecasts use a 5% drop from 2018 school 
vaccination rates in schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated for six Texas metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The total number of days 
each unvaccinated student was suspended from their school was summed for 4 intervention scenarios that mandate student suspensions. 
Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Confidence interval 
on the 95th percentile value, calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap estimate, is provided in parentheses. 
 
Intervention 
Austin- 
Round Rock-
Georgetown 
Beaumont- 
Port Arthur 
Dallas- 
Fort Worth-
Arlington 
Houston- 
Sugar Land-
Baytown 
Midland Tyler 
Suspend unvaccinated. 
students if measles in 
school 
20.0 
(17.9–21.7) 
7.3 
(6.5–8.3) 
19.1 
(15.9–22.5) 
32.0 
(26.5–38.2) 
8.3 
(7.5–9.3) 
8.0 
(7.2–8.6) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in 
area 
1000.0 
(915.9–1070.8) 
135.8 
(123.1–141.2) 
4640.1 
(4384.7–4898.6) 
5101.1 
(4808.8–5536.2) 
86.2 (81.8–90.2) 
62.4 
(58.6–65.6) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
in school 
13.6 
(12.4–15.3) 
4.7 
(4.2–5.3) 
13.7 
(12.1–15.0) 
20.6 
(17.8–23.4) 
5.5 
(5.1–5.8) 
5.5 
(5.0–6.2) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
in area 
736.9 
(705.5–797.5) 
87.8 
(83.0–95.6) 
3316.0 
(3178.5–3481.8) 
3752.2 
(3574.8–4010.3) 
59.8 
(56.2–64.3) 
46.0 
(43.3–48.0) 
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Appendix 5. Forecast outbreak sizes if interventions are applied only to “refusers” (1000s), compared to when interventions are applied to 
both refusers and students who are medically ineligible for vaccination. Forecasts given for 2018 vaccination rates, and for a 5% drop from 
2018 school vaccination rates in schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated. Forecasts for different intervention policies in Austin-Round 
Rock-Georgetown. Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario. 
Confidence interval on the 95th percentile value is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
 
2018 vaccination rate 2018 vaccination rate -5% 
Intervention 
Refusers and 
medically ineligible 
Refusers only 
Refusers and 
medically ineligible 
Refusers only 
None 
527 
(466–572) 
n/a 
1503 
(1295–1691) 
n/a 
Suspend unvaccinated students if 
measles in school 
19 
(17–21) 
18 
(17–18) 
34 
(31–39) 
34 
(31–38) 
Suspend unvaccinated students if 
measles in area 
17 
(15–20) 
18 
(16–18) 
24 
(21–26) 
23 
(22–24) 
Suspend & vaccinate unvaccinated 
students if in school 
18 
(16–20) 
18 
(17–18) 
33 
(30–37) 
33 
(31–35) 
Suspend & vaccinate unvaccinated 
students if in area 
18 
(17–20) 
21 
(18–21) 
22 
(20–24) 
21 
(19–22) 
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Appendix 6. Forecast number of measles cases for 3 different contact distributions. The 3 contact distributions represent different 
estimates of the mean ratio of contacts made in households, workplaces, schools, and neighborhoods provided in Table 1. Forecasts are 
given for 2018 vaccination rates, and for a 5% drop from 2018 school vaccination rates in schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated. 
Forecasts for different intervention policies in Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown. Vaccination policies only applied to refusers and not 
medically ineligible students. Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case 
scenario. Confidence interval on the 95th percentile value is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
2018 vaccinate rate 2018 vaccinate rate -5% 
Intervention Distribution 1 Distribution 2 Distribution 3 Distribution 1 Distribution 2 Distribution 3 
None 
527 
(466–572) 
517 
(459–584) 
415 
(348–451) 
1503 
(1295–1691) 
1636 
(1472–1851) 
1437 
(1180–1686) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in 
school 
19 
(17–21) 
21 
(19–23) 
19 
(17–20) 
34 
(31–39) 
34 
(32–38) 
31 
(27–34) 
Suspend unvaccinated 
students if measles in area 
18 
(16–20) 
20 
(18–21) 
18 
(17–20) 
24 
(21–26) 
24 
(23–25) 
20 
(19–22) 
Vaccinate unvaccinated 
students if measles in 
school 
49 
(43–59) 
62 
(55–73) 
59 
(52–68) 
132 
(113–153) 
163 
(145–188) 
135 
(120–155) 
Vaccinate unvaccinated 
students if measles in area 
50 
(43–53) 
57 
(51–62) 
56 
(46–62) 
49 
(43–53) 
52 
(47–59) 
55 
(50–65) 
Suspend & vaccinate 
unvaccinated students if 
measles in school 
18 
(16–20) 
21 
(16–21) 
19 
(15–19) 
33 
(30–37) 
36 
(30–38) 
30 
(27–33) 
Suspend & vaccinate. 
unvaccinated students if 
measles in area 
18 
(17–20) 
19 
(18–23) 
17 
(17–22) 
22 
(20–24) 
20 
(19–22) 
19 
(18–21) 
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